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Filling the Holes in Whistleblower Protection
Systems: Lessons from the Hanford Council
Experience
Jonathan Brock, Associate Professor Emeritus, University of
Washington
I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to understand and assess the factors that help or hinder


In addition to readily available sources, the observations in this article benefit from
more than three decades of research and practice activities by the author in a broad range
of workplace and policy disputes. This background includes the author’s involvement in
the study team assembled at the University of Washington that in 1992 initially
recommended the adoption of a new whistleblower dispute resolution system at Hanford,
and then his becoming the founding chairperson of the Hanford Joint Council (Hanford
Council), where he has overseen several iterations of the system. This initial study and
subsequent work has allowed comparison with results of whistleblower cases handled
through the Council system versus those handled through other more common processes,
including processes sponsored by government contractors and by the Department of
Energy (DOE), and cases handled through litigation, or through processes offered
through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
In addition to this direct experience at Hanford, much of the conceptual background
for the comparisons in this article comes from experience in assessing as well as assisting
in the mediation of workplace and policy disputes and helping establishing systems to do
so—in fields ranging from health care, transportation, firefighting to land use,
agriculture, and others. Some of this work was done as the founding director of the
William D. Ruckelshaus Center, under the guidance of board chair William D.
Ruckelshaus. In this and other professorial and research roles, he has examined dozens
of significant policy and workplace conflict resolution events and systems in the Pacific
Northwest and elsewhere in the country.
Other aspects of the analysis herein benefit from his experience in workplace policy
and regulatory issues as a result of serving three US secretaries of labor, and time on the
staff of an early OSHA assistant secretary. Several published works by the author have
received recognition for their contributions to workplace dispute resolution theory and
practice. He was recently appointed by the US Secretary of Labor to the new
Whistleblower Protection Advisory Committee.
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resolution of whistleblower conflicts, this paper draws lessons from a
voluntary whistleblower case resolution system—the Hanford Concerns
Council (Hanford Council, or Council) system—that has operated
successfully over a sixteen year period. The Hanford Council system
supplements existing regulatory and administrative mechanisms for
handling whistleblower rights and concerns. It came into being after years
of protracted public controversies and related court battles over
whistleblower cases at the Hanford Nuclear site in Southwest Washington
State stemming from the failure of then existing mechanisms to address
these conflicts.1 The site was part of the production complex for nuclear
weapons materials during World War II and the Cold War. By the early
1990s, when the Hanford Council system was established, the site mission
had already shifted from production of nuclear fuel to the cleanup of the
highly contaminated site near the Columbia River.
In 1992, in response to the controversies over whistleblower issues, and
at the request of Christine O. Gregoire, then director of the Washington
State Department of Ecology, the University of Washington’s (UW)
Institute for Public Policy and Management conducted a study of the way
whistleblower issues were handled at Hanford. Based on the gaps in
process, practice, and tools and using best practices as a reference, the UW
study produced the principles that led to the Council system. The Council
system that emerged was structured, and has been further refined, to correct
for the particular difficulties, barriers, and gaps often found when
employees try to exercise whistleblower rights and employers try to respond
within the usual structures and assumptions available.2
1
E.g., Jonathan Brock, Full and Fair Resolution of Whistleblower Issues: the Hanford
Joint Council, A Pilot ADR Approach, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 497, 498–501 (1999)
[hereinafter Brock, Full and Fair Resolution] (summarizing resolution of prior
controversies).
2
See generally Inst. Pub. Pol’y and Mgmt., External Third-Party Review of Significant
Employee Concerns: The Joint Cooperative Council for Hanford Disputes (Univ. of
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In accordance with the principles developed, the Hanford Council system
is independent of internal systems handled by companies and agencies, but
is mindful of those systems and their roles and impact and connects to them
in carefully restructured ways that promote resolution of whistleblower
issues. This paper recognizes that while many whistleblower cases are
handled effectively by the internal systems of some companies and the
systems offered by some agencies, many more are not handled effectively—
largely because of structural problems and missing features of these
systems. While the Council example is specific in its application to Hanford
and, perhaps, government nuclear facilities, this assessment is intended to
suggest common limitations in the characteristics of many whistleblower
protection programs and to identify features and principles that may, in a
wider variety of circumstances, be applicable.
These common limitations often preclude the stable resolution of the
problem that has been raised and, further, generally lead to a failure to
actually protect and encourage the right to blow the whistle. This means that
the purposes of national policies—to encourage or protect whistleblowers
and to gain the benefit of addressing problems that may need attention in
our institutions—often are not met by the systems and practices that
typically flow from policies intended to benefit whistleblowing. This article
will examine these and other frequently found barriers to the effective
handling of whistleblower cases and describe what can be learned from the
Hanford Council system to help overcome these barriers, even within the
context of existing policies, programs, and processes.
Using the expanded scope, tools and approaches it has available, the
Hanford Council system has developed a strong track record of resolving
cases that had eluded, or were projected to elude, resolution in the normally
available systems. Similar disputes at Hanford that have not gone through
Wash. Graduate Sch. of Pub. Affairs, Working Paper No. 93–99, 1992), available at
http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/council_resources_uwpapers.pdf.
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the Hanford Council system have more often resulted in six and seven
figure settlements, equally large legal costs, and significant disruption to
operations and workplace relationships, usually resulting in job loss for
affected employees and, often, for some involved managers. Every conflict
accepted into the Hanford Council system has resulted in a mediated
resolution, usually with minimal disruption.
In most instances, the Hanford Council system not only addresses
retaliation against employees who have blown the whistle, but also
addresses underlying safety systems issues, policies, management practices,
and, often, relationship and cultural issues contributing to the
misunderstandings and behaviors in the workplace that spawned the original
problem or dispute. Such broader results, particularly where the underlying
substantive issue is resolved and the relationship of the employee and the
company is repaired, are rare in the more typical application of
whistleblower rights. The Council system is also able to help an employee
accept a result where the issue turned out to be less significant than the
employee may initially have thought or where the employee’s own skills at
raising issues could be improved, and to smooth the way for a restored
workplace relationship.
However, among the lessons to be learned from the Hanford Council
model is the fact that much can be improved in the outcome of
whistleblower conflicts within existing statutory and regulatory
frameworks. An important part of the success of the Hanford Council
alternative is that it is structured to supplement, and often relies on rights
and responsibilities established by existing programs. The features
discussed below are important to the success of such supplemental
mechanisms. Many of them could become features of existing company or
government programs, though the specific law, industry, and agency
jurisdiction and characteristics will affect what is possible and what are to
be the most important considerations. Some laws, as well as some agency or
company practices or traditions, will restrict the degree of potential
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adoption of these features, and, certainly, statutory and regulatory change
would be valuable in many areas. But such changes are not essential to gain
improvements in existing programs. Of course, reform only comes by the
will of leadership and the willingness of authoritative or affected parties to
support or cooperate.
The following simple features, if used together and adapted to match the
circumstances, are key ingredients to supplement existing whistleblower
protection schemes. The result need not look like the Hanford Council, but
can take a form that matches up to the needs of the circumstances.
1.

Independence of the mechanism handling the dispute.

2.

Strict confidentiality of the process.

3.

Ability to “stabilize” or “freeze” the dispute and avoid further
escalation while it is being addressed.

4.

Ability to protect and support the employee (and protect
management from committing or exacerbating potential violations)
during the resolution process.

5.

Emphasis on resolution in a non-adversarial process, while
preserving the rights of the parties to access adversarial channels.

6.

Precluding individuals and offices with a vested interest (see below
for details) in the outcome from influencing the evaluation and the
resolution of the claim by the independent mechanism.

7.

Flexibility in tools and processes so that the tools fit the issues.

8.

Focus on problem solving rather than on the assignment of blame.

9.

Involvement of managers with program knowledge and broad
responsibility rather than delegation to specialized offices or
functions. Involvement of non-company and non-agency parties,
including employee advocates.

10. Mandate for comprehensive solutions (both the substantive and the
relationship issues in the situation) and not limiting the inquiry to an
exploration of alleged violations of employment rights.
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11. Connection of the system to existing authorities for action or policy
change, and protection of rights, provision of opportunities for quiet
assessment and resolution, and accountability for fair outcomes.
12. Mutual confidence of leaders in the affected employer and of
employee communities in the fairness of the system.
The Hanford Council system allows the employer to respond positively
within the dispute process. Employer cooperation is much more likely when
the employer is not immediately faced with adversarial proceedings and the
attendant risks for individual and corporate goals. Resistance is similarly
lessened when the employer is given the chance to avoid organizational
disruption and to learn useful lessons without a public spanking. In contrast,
the adversarial systems within many statutory programs and internal
problem solving systems do not, in fact, focus on problem solving, but
instead encourage significant effort on avoiding or fixing blame.
By developing a system that steers away from these common but
unfortunate incentives, the Council system has side-stepped litigated cases
entirely, minimized operational disruption and diversion of management
and union leadership resources, saved careers of both managers and
workers, and improved safety practices. Comparing cases of employees not
eligible for the Hanford system with cases that have gone through the
Hanford system shows starkly different results for individuals and
companies, different levels of impact on the issues raised by the
whistleblowers, and different results in the willingness of employees to
bring issues forward and of management to engage in problem solving, not
to mention the starkly different financial impacts.3 The benefits that stem
from the avoidance of project and mission disruption and of work group
3

See Built on an Established History of Success, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL,
http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/council_history.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2012);
see also Council Ensures that Mediation Beats Litigation, TRI-CITY HERALD, Aug. 12,
2008,
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/press_
tricityherald20080812.pdf.
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relationships should not be overlooked.
Experience with the Hanford Council system suggests that win-win
solutions are usually possible and that conflict elements are rarely
irreconcilable. If more attention is given to supplementing existing systems
and authorities with the important features listed above, gains can be made
in worker protections, and opportunities can arise for addressing important
organizational and work site problems. By supplementing existing systems
to encourage people to come forward and companies to cooperate, while
lowering the risks to both parties, national whistleblower policies and
derivative systems could more likely serve their goals. Therefore,
examination of the Hanford Council system in more detail may have
benefits in evaluating important alternative approaches and in identifying
useful tools.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE HANFORD COUNCIL SYSTEM
The Hanford Council system4 has been in operation at the Hanford
Nuclear Site near Richland, WA, for sixteen of the last eighteen years. The
Council has received approximately 140 cases.5 Based on internal Council
record keeping, the Council has resolved 100 percent of the cases it
accepted for resolution through its system (of cases received, approximately
half have been accepted).6 Cases are reviewed through an intake process,7
during which the Council determines if it has the jurisdiction and tools to be
of assistance or if the situation can be handled more effectively by other
means. The merits of the cases are not judged until a more complete

4

Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1 (describing the basic design features
and the means of their development for the Hanford Council system).
5
First-hand observation of Council case activities and knowledge of case outcomes.
6
Id.
7
Council Charter, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL § 7.3 (June 1, 2008),
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/council_charter.pdf
[hereinafter
Charter] (referencing the “triage” of cases at intake).
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assessment of the issues is performed. Resolution means that the Council’s
recommendation is a consensus recommendation and is accepted by the
affected employer and by the employee who brought forward the
complaint.8 The Council possesses special authorities granted by the
Hanford Concerns Council Charter (Charter)9 agreement, which defines the
Council’s responsibilities and authorities for intervention in whistleblower
disputes. The Charter, agreed to by participating companies and the major
advocacy group at the site, and approved by the US Department of Energy
(DOE),10 restricts the Council’s jurisdiction to cases concerning workplace
and environmental safety and health issues. Within that scope, however, the
Charter provides a great deal of flexibility in the tools applied to resolve
each situation.
The Council does not deal with, among other things, whistleblowing on
financial issues, classified information, or health benefit claims related to
incidents involving nuclear or workplace safety, though many of its cases
contain such incidents or issues. The Charter pledges that the Council will
not interfere in established collective bargaining rights, though most of its
cases involve bargaining unit employees. Worker compensation programs
and insurance systems make health benefit determinations, but many of
those coming to the Council have, and retain, rights to make such claims.11

8

First-hand observation of Council case activities and knowledge of case outcomes.
Charter, supra note 7 (describing the Council’s unique grant of authority from the
parties and the ways in which it can operate to exercise this authority).
10
Presumption Implementation Brings Closure to Disputes, HANFORD CONCERNS
COUNCIL, http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/work_corporate.htm (last visited Dec.
18, 2012); A Less Costly and Time Consuming Method of Conflict Resolution, HANFORD
CONCERNS COUNCIL, http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/work_doeorp.htm (last
visited Dec. 18, 2012); Advocacy Participation Ensures a Fair Hearing, HANFORD
CONCERNS COUNCIL, http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/work_interestgroup.htm
(last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
11
Charter, supra note 7, §§ 1.1, 1.2.2.
9
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The Council uses an unusual form of mediation,12 combining several
considerations into its assessment and recommendations: the impacts on the
individual’s career trajectory as a result of the conflict,13 any actual safety
problems that may require attention,14 any underlying systems or workplace
problems,15 and the importance of promoting a safety-conscious work
environment and a safe and productive cleanup of the Hanford site. To
produce a recommendation that is accepted by the employee and
implemented by the company, the Council uses a mediation system that
begins with its own, independent assessment of the situation. Unlike
adversarial proceedings, this assessment is undertaken jointly by specially
selected16 representatives of the company and of whistleblower advocacy
groups who are members of the Council. Their joint work product provides
a factual basis for addressing the issues, and is not intended to establish
blame, but address the problems and the conflict that has resulted.17
12
A Membership That Ensures Neutrality, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL,
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/work_neutrality.htm (last visited Dec. 18,
2012) (summarizing the uniqueness of the mediation system).
13
HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, 2010 PROGRESS REPORT 8 (2010), available at
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/report_progressreport2010.pdf
[hereinafter HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT].
14
HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org (last visited Dec.
18, 2012) (describing how the Hanford Concerns Council can address safety issues);
Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 501–02.
15
See, e.g., PATRICK N. BREYSSE & MARK R. STENZEL, INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL
REPORT ON CHEMICAL VAPORS INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE STRATEGY, HANFORD
CONCERNS COUNCIL (2010), http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/report_irp_
20101027.pdf. These recommendations were substantially adopted by Washington River
Protection Systems, effectively ending years of conflict and whistleblower cases
concerning chemical vapors at the site. Id.
16
Charter, supra note 7, § 4.5 (describing selection and appointment of members); see
Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 517–19 (discussing membership roles
and dynamics).
17
Author’s observation of the Council system. The assessment phase provides an agreed
upon factual basis from which consensus on a resolution can be sought to address the full
range of issues, including employment rights, safety and health practices, and systems
improvements, as appropriate to the case.
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This mediation system is unlike the more common mediation format in a
litigated case, or in an arbitrated case, in which each side presents its case or
proposal and the mediator or arbitrator makes or helps the parties make a
decision, or in which the parties simply try to reach an agreement on a
dollar figure. Because the statutes that often spawn these mediated
opportunities only guarantee employment rights, mediation sessions under
existing statutory mediation programs are not commonly used to address the
actual issues about which employees were concerned or to make other
changes dictated by underlying circumstances.18 Instead, these more
traditional mediations usually only address the issue of employment status.
Several prominent attorneys that represent whistleblowers, and who have
observed the Hanford Council system first hand, have commented on how
much more information is gathered—and far more quickly—than in any of
the more usual adversarial proceedings.19 Company representatives are
similarly amazed at the value and degree of problem solving, and the
improvement in work systems and practices, that can result.20 Much of the
Council system’s productivity comes from the mutual approach to blamefree solutions and the related lack of adversarial proceedings. Other factors
are also crucial, as will be discussed below.
The Hanford Council handles only highly polarized or complex cases that
are not expected to be susceptible to solution through normal in-house,
administrative, judicial, or arbitration channels.21 Assessment of the facts
18

See Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 500–02 (describing how
traditional and statutory programs were largely restricted to employment rights issues or
narrower conceptions of the conflict than could resolve the conflict); Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1), (b)(1) (2005) (describing where the
right is defined related to employment discrimination, such as discharge or adverse action
related to employment).
19
Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 514.
20
Discussions with present and former company representatives.
21
HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, supra note 14. The ability to resolve cases not
expected to be addressable by other channels is noted on the Council web site home page,
as is the point that corporate, advocacy, and neutral perspectives are at the table. Id.
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and development of a solution is carried on in the Council among its
specially appointed representatives and under the Council’s rules. Thus, the
issues are considered among members that will understand the employee
advocacy point of view and the company view, but who are not directly
involved in the conflict and who would not be permitted to continue their
involvement if the matter ultimately proceeded to litigation. An additional
group of “neutral” members, previously unaffiliated with Hanford, are
appointed to provide balance to the “seats” in this group.22
The assessment process starts with gathering information from the
affected employee, the company, witnesses and experts, and collecting and
reviewing relevant documents and analyses. The Council can revisit any of
these sources for clarification. The information is reviewed, and the Council
members seek to reach a consensus regarding what actually gave rise to the
conflict and what would be fair, necessary and appropriate to resolve it.
With guidance from the full Council, the initial work is usually done in a
subcommittee that contains at least one representative from each seat
(company, advocate, neutral). As a group, subcommittee members review
all of the available information and participate equally in determining what
should be examined. The subcommittee distills the information and brings it
to the full Council for further assessment and guidance, and later for review
of suggested resolution principles or recommendations. At various points in
the process, the Council reviews the subcommittee’s progress and checks on
open questions with the affected company and employee as it moves
towards a resolution. Eventually, the subcommittee will bring a framework
for resolution or a draft recommendation to the full Council for review,

These representatives who are uninvolved with the dispute, but affiliated with the
perspectives in the dispute, are the ones that have the responsibility to resolve it, rather
than those whose emotions have been aroused, often in a lengthy conflict. Id.
22
Inst. Pub. Pol’y and Mgmt., supra note 2, at 7–8 (noting use of neutral members), and
See generally Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1.
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development, or any needed refinement.23
While the advocacy and company perspectives differ, all members are
individually appointed and share a commitment to the Council resolution
process and to reaching a consensus on a reasonable resolution. As a result
of working together, the group develops trust and working relationships that
allow robust examination of the data, and carrying out of interviews and
other analysis of the situation with a common goal. This is accomplished
without the polarization and suspicion common to whistleblower conflicts
and related resolution systems. This work is detailed, painstaking, and often
difficult. The quality and value of the resolutions must be seen, first, in
comparison to similar cases not handled through the Council system, but,
rather, through the other available systems, to which even a poor Council
resolution inevitably compares extremely well in terms of direct and
indirect costs. The depth and breadth achieved in a particular case will vary
depending upon the factors particular to each case and the context in which
the case emerges.24
The Council has authority to take “stabilization” actions that are used to
preclude or reduce the impact of additional or escalated conflict between the
involved parties while the case is being processed. Such actions are rarely
available in other systems. Whistleblower cases fought through the normal
channels usually produce enormous stress for affected employees and often
for their supervisors—not to mention their families.25 Stabilization actions
23

Author’s observations of Council case processing.
Author’s observations of results and of the reactions of employees, company
leadership, Council members, government officials and others regarding Council
resolutions, and specific cost and impact comparisons regularly made by the Council in
examining outcomes of cases outside the system, compared to costs and impacts of
similar cases handled inside.
25
E.g., Contracting Oversight Subcommittee, Whistleblower Protections for Government
Contractors, HSGAC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT (Dec. 6, 2011)
(statement by Dr. Walter Tomosaitis), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
subcommittees/contracting-oversight/hearings/whistleblower-protections-forgovernment-contractors. See also STEPHEN MARTIN KOHN, THE WHISTLEBLOWER’S
24
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are used to preclude or address any further conflict among the involved
parties, which can include temporary transfers or less formal intervention in
the day-to-day conflict that otherwise seems to naturally occur when a
whistleblower case is being adjudicated through many other systems. By
consulting closely with the employee and employer, these stabilization
actions are done without disruption to ongoing business or harm to career
trajectory.26 The Council ordinarily has frequent, sometimes daily or
weekly, contact with the employee not only to keep him or her informed,
but also to help him or her cope with the circumstances and stay focused on
his or her work, or if the employee is off work, on his or her family and
other things that can help to reduce and manage the stresses that inevitably
arise.
The Council tries to convey to both parties that it is handling the situation
through a blame-free, problem solving approach and that they will be
involved as needed. Thus, ongoing work can be attended to. When a similar
case at Hanford takes place outside of the Council, work is regularly
disrupted for months for dozens of people, including leadership. At times,
on some projects, work has literally been halted. To help prevent disruption,
employees with Council cases are encouraged to avoid gossip about their
situations with co-workers and others. However, the Council urges
employees with cases in the Council system to find sources of support
among family, close friends, and, as needed, medical providers.

HANDBOOK: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO DOING WHAT’S RIGHT AND PROTECTING
YOURSELF (2011) (describing twenty-one different strategies for how to cope with these
stresses). See generally MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & PENINA M. GLAZER, THE
WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY (1989)
(describing pressures of coming forward as a whistleblower); American Whistleblower
ACCOUNTABILITY
PROJECT,
http://whistleblower.org/actionTour,
GOV’T
center/american-whistleblower-tour (last visited Dec. 18, 2012); HANFORD CHALLENGE,
http://www.hanfordchallenge.org (last visited Dec. 18, 2012)
26
Charter, supra note 7, § 7.5.2 (discussing authority to undertake stabilization actions
and the need to balance intervention with the ongoing mission to support site operations).
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This approach also allows the company officials involved in the situation
to focus on their jobs and reduce the stresses that would come from an
ongoing daily conflict and the attendant posturing.27 Imposing a relative
calm around the conflict, resulting from this suspension of the usual
hostilities, facilitates effective problem solving. More often than not, rather
than being a function of intended wrongdoing or retaliation, a case is a
function of misunderstanding, poor practices or tensions, traditions or habits
in the workplace, or mistakes or ignorance about how to properly deal with
concerns. Most often, the substantive issue raised by the employee is
relevant—whether a safety problem, system’s flaw, or mishandling of the
right to raise issues—but it is not always precisely the issue that the
employee or management had thought, and it often has dimensions or
causes that neither side saw clearly and that may have been overestimated
or underestimated by the involved parties. If any violations of law or
regulation are found, they must be reported.28
The benefit of the Hanford Council’s independent initial assessment is
that these additional aspects of the situation are uncovered, usually allowing
the fundamental causes to be addressed and the full dimensions of the
problem to be solved. The typical result is that the employee returns to
regular and productive work largely, if not entirely, free from the tensions
and mistrust that led him or her to raise the issues outside the organization.
Sometimes the resolution prescribes that the employee resumes work in a
different job or location at the site. Often, a “mentor” or “buffer” person is
assigned from within the company for a short period of time to aid the
transition back to normal working relationships and preclude old tensions or
suspicions from returning.
27
These actions are seen earlier on in many cases that occur outside Council jurisdiction,
before the Council has informed those previously involved, and before fully establishing
its role in the case.
28
Charter, supra note 7, § 5.7 (describing requirements to report violations)
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The usual circumstance is that the Hanford Council, following an
assessment and consideration of an appropriate solution, presents its
recommendation to the employee and the president of the affected
company. According to the Charter, the company, with minor exception, is
bound to accept any consensus recommendation of the Council.29 The
employee is not bound to accept, but every employee has done so thus far.30
The Council does not bargain with the parties, but it can modify
implementation details to better ensure the purpose and implementation of
the resolution.
Because of the consultation that has taken place throughout the Council
process, the proposal for resolution is rarely a surprise to either party.
Typically, the result is not precisely what either party might have
anticipated or expected at the outset, but the resolution is usually seen as, at
least, an acceptable resolution of the issues. With the additional briefings,
information, and deeper resolution provided by the Council, the parties
(more often than not) understand the reasoning behind the proposed
solution,31 which adds to their acceptance of it and commitment to it.
Because the Council gains from its extensive assessment, it is able to
develop and integrate information not previously available to or known by
29

Id. § 2.6.6.
Id. § 2.6. While the Charter is specific in Section 2.6 on the obligation of the
participating company to implement consensus recommendations except under unusual
circumstances, it is purposely silent on any obligation of the employee. Id. This is by
agreement of the Charter parties. Id. The involvement and consensus of employer and
employee advocacy representatives is the key channel by which the resolutions are
shaped to be palatable to both sides, but based on the Council’s assessment. Id. Then,
they can be presented in a way that demonstrates the benefits and the tradeoffs to each,
resulting in acceptance. Id. Usually, the president of the company and the employee are
consulted along the way so that they are informed of the findings once they emerge. Id.
This often alters the perspective held by one or both sides and lays the groundwork for
development and later acceptance of the Council’s proposed resolution, which is
effectively mediated inside the Council and provided to the parties. Id.
31
Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 515–16 (describing gaining
acceptance of the process for maintaining employee/employer relations).
30
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either of the parties. And because it is able to apply its combined
perspectives to find a resolution, the resolution is different, and usually
more robust and stable, than either party would likely have achieved
through other channels.
Quite often the degree of satisfaction and restoration of work
relationships for both parties is substantial. At a minimum, the company has
avoided litigation, protracted instability, or other management, mission, or
business risks or interruptions, while the employee has been relieved of
stresses and uncertainties, and finds some vindication in the exercise of his
or her rights, as well as hope for future protection and less stressful working
conditions. There have been a few cases where the relationship has soured
and further conflict has taken place following the resolution, often due to
transitions within the company or other changes related to site
responsibilities.
As noted in the Charter agreement, consensus is necessary to ensure
company acceptance of a case recommendation.32 To reach consensus, all
Council members who are eligible to participate in the case must be in
agreement. The members who are eligible to participate in a case generally
include three members from the affected company, three members
representing employee advocacy organizations, three neutral representatives
with no ties to Hanford companies or interests, and a neutral chairperson.33
Consensus comes about partly because of the recognition by the
Council’s participating advocacy groups and corporate members and DOE
leadership that the alternatives are inevitably worse just by their nature.
They typically involve extensive depositions, investigations, and other
litigation costs, as well as the debilitating indirect impacts and costs on
working relationships, reputations, public confidence in the competence of
government and contractors, and, often, on the progress of the nuclear
32
33

Charter, supra note 7, § 2.6.
Id. §§ 4.2, 3.2.
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clean-up work. As noted, these adversarial methods may also create
disruptions in the personal lives of managers and employees, such as
diversion from work, as well as attendant conflicts, stresses, and tensions.34
Because so many factors are usually involved, the employment rights
remedy—one of the most common bases for whistleblower statutes35—will
not likely address the roots of the conflict. Therefore, such remedy does not
permit a resolution that can normally lead to stability. Nor can it address the
policy goals of fixing an organizational problem and making it safe for
employees to raise, and employers to work on, issues that will improve
practices or meet some other intended public standard.
In contrast, the absence of assigned blame in the Council system
broadens the focus of the process, changes the behavior of the parties, and,
therefore, the outcomes.36 Few Council cases involve monetary settlements,
perhaps because of the interest of the parties in addressing the actual issues
and the ability of the system to actually do so, particularly in a blame-free
manner. Most employees blow the whistle to solve a problem that they see
at work. If the resolution solves the problem and gives them a reasonable
assurance for a stable future employment relationship, money is not needed
to resolve the matter.37 This pattern of positive outcomes for both parties
34

See generally TRI-CITY HERALD, supra note 3; HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL,
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 13, at 2, 5 (quoting Christine Gregoire); Brock, Full and
Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 502–03 (quoting former US DOE secretary, Hazel
O’Leary).
35
Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 501–02 (concerning limitations of
common whistleblower protection programs). See also Thomas M. Devine, The
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: Foundation for the Modern Law of Employment
Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531 (1999).
36
HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 13, at 4 (stating
approaches that avoid blame and seek comprehensive solutions that have both the
potential to restore the employment relationship and actually protect employment rights).
37
One pattern I have observed is that in the early part of a case, before substantive
solutions are found, discussions or demands about dollars are in rather high numbers.
Those numbers drop or disappear the more complete the resolution is relative to the real
concerns and career impacts. Most cases where money is part of the resolution are those
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demonstrates the value of dealing substantively and honorably with the
concerns that are raised.
A resolution letter or memo of agreement may prove beneficial even
where a settlement agreement is unnecessary. Formal legal agreements are
typically necessary only if there is payment to the employee, or if a court or
regulatory agency requires documentation of withdrawal or related
resolution.38

III. BARRIERS AND GAPS IN STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAMS
The following section describes limitations typically present in systems
intended to encourage or protect whistleblowers. These limitations are often
present in systems intended to encourage or protect whistleblowers.39
As this article argues, these limitations mean that many public policy
attempts in the United States to promote whistleblowing and advance
potential societal or industrial benefits from whistleblowing activities have
failed to meet expectations.40 Although the individuals working within these
systems are dedicated and hardworking, the tools and processes available to
them are limited and often interfere with resolutions intended to uphold or
encourage the exercise of whistleblower rights.
Observing the programs that run parallel to the Council system in the
federal nuclear complex, as well as from less extensive experience
observing whistleblowing in other sectors, one can see many of these
where the conflict has proceeded too far to be resolvable through substantive changes in
practices or workplace relationships, or in other exceptional circumstances.
38
See HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 13.
39
Robert Vaughn, Whistleblower Protections and the Challenge to Public Employment
Law, in PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 182
(2007) (discussing the challenges whistleblower protections impose on employment law).
40
E.g., Richard Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65 (2007)
[hereinafter Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations].
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barriers.41 The prevalence of the following limiting factors has been found
at Hanford as well as at other sites. The factors will be identified in italics,
and their possible causes will be denoted in regular type.
A. Many regulatory systems only protect employment rights to blow the
whistle without retaliation, and substantive issues or underlying
conflicts that spawned the complaint are either not reachable by the
program or not meaningfully addressed.
1.

The failure to address underlying concerns may be due to
limitations on agency or program jurisdiction, agency expertise
or resources, or on access to candid and in depth information.42
It may also be due to the fact that, in a system focused on
employment rights, pressure falls on the employee to drop the
issue, leave employment, or settle rather than suffer the
challenges, stresses, and costs of the administrative processes.

B. The focus on proving fault through investigation and hearings creates
posturing and defensiveness on both sides and precludes the candor
necessary to find and address key issues and potential solutions.
1.

When there is an important necessity of establishing agency
jurisdiction, showing intent to enforce, establishing case law, or
convincing a company or agency to use mediation alternatives,
using a system that requires finding fault may be the only way
to address a particular issue. However, it is normally not a
useful approach even though parties often see a necessity to
place blame or “teach a lesson” through a formal adjudication.

41
These conclusions are based on the author’s experience and observations centered on
close observation and mediation of whistleblower cases at Hanford, as well as mediation,
experience, and research in other settings intended to produce alternatives to complex and
polarized legal and political disputes.
42
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1), (b)(1) (describing where the right is defined related
to employment discrimination, such as discharge or adverse action related to
employment); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTION: SUSTAINED MANAGEMENT ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS LONGSTANDING PROGRAM WEAKNESSES (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
310/308767.pdf (exemplifying issues dealt with by OSHA).
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C. Lack of access to support and guidance normally needed for employees
to file a claim likely to receive a full and fair examination.
1.

Employees understandably find it difficult to manage the
pressures and demands of working on a case against one’s
employer while continuing employment, or to do so if one is
unemployed and lacking normal income and support systems.

2.

The employee may feel escalating levels of conflict and tension
between himself and management, as well as with co-workers.

3.

The whistleblower may lack confidence that his issue will be
effectively handled if he or she does come forward.

4.

Many internal and some agency programs are seen as beholden
to employer interests; employees, therefore, perceive that they
cannnot get support that they are willing or able to rely upon.

D. Insufficient confidentiality or protection of information contributes to
employee and employer reluctance to engage in problem solving.
1.

The employee is concerned about exposing himself or herself to
retaliation or other consequences from supervisors or peers.

2.

The employer fears that candid exploration of the problem could
be misinterpreted or misused or used to file other actions.

3.

Witnesses may be reluctant due to fear of repercussions.

4.

The possibility of posturing increases in non-confidential,
unprotected settings, while the likelihood of candor and
admission of error leading to solutions decreases.

5.

Documentation requirements of some agencies or internal
systems may preclude some employees, employers, unions, or
others from engaging in a constructive resolution because of
what might be required to have on the record.

E. The parties may perceive insufficient independence, balance, and
objectivity in the process.43
43
Observations of the factors in this section (and other observations throughout this
section and elsewhere in the paper), come from the author’s involvement in processing
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1.

While many effective internal programs exist, it is also common
for employees or factions of employees to not trust these
internal employee concerns programs because these programs
are controlled by the very employer against whom the employee
is raising the concern. This may also be true of agencysponsored programs when employees do not perceive them as
existing independently of the employer or being sufficiently
knowledgeable about the issues.

2.

People who have limited or no valuable knowledge or standing
in the concern, have motivation to, and find ways to, influence
the investigation and decisions surrounding the case.

3.

Usually, such people’s interests are parochial and relate to old
rivalries, perceived professional obligations, or concerns about
having their own error exposed.

F. Employers are often resistant to investigating whistleblower claims
internally and to working with regulatory agencies tasked with
investigating whistleblower complaints.
1.

Lack of confidence on the part of the employer that the
applicable regulatory or administrative agency has the expertise
or objectivity to provide a fair adjudication of the claim.
Employees often have these doubts as well.44

2.

Economic or other penalties potentially facing the employer
may create an impetus to resist rather than explore the claim.45

3.

Mistakes in initial responses by inexperienced or
unsophisticated supervisors and other employees may lead to
violations of employee rights that then expose the company to
liability. In such situations, employers often default to defensive

over a hundred cases through the Hanford Council system, as well as in processing and
studying cases and conflicts in the other systems noted.
44
See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provisions Ten Years Later, 64
S. C. L. REV. 1 (2012) (suggesting many difficulties and barriers in fulfilling public
policy expectations of whistleblower protections).
45
This comes from discussions about and observation of the response of many
supervisors and managers to their perceptions of corporate or government expectations,
or concerns about peer pressures, or failure to follow traditions.
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postures, decreasing possibilities for effective resolution.
4.

The tendency of offices responsible for defending claims is
often to go quickly into “fight” mode, partly due to a lack of
flexible tools, structure, or mandate for utilizing alternative
approaches. In many existing programs, the threat of a lawsuit
or other adversarial actions places these agents automatically on
the defensive. This is often executed using traditional methods
for preparing for adversarial proceedings, which often has the
effect of further polarizing the conflict and moving further away
from the actual issues. On the other hand, many professionals in
these offices and the advocates who oppose them in court, when
involved with the Council system, are able to constructively
engage in problem solving. Hence, this is most likely a failure of
the systems, tools, and structure of the processes available to
them and not necessarily a failure of individual intentions,
talent, or willingness to put forth effort.

5.

Only rarely is it that the management that can sufficiently affect
the underlying causes and relationships fundamentally involved
in resolving these issues once the complaint becomes an issue
for the legal office or for formal labor relations treatment.

6.

Employers sometimes attempt to reach resolutions or prevail in
adversarial proceedings through the involvement of subject
matter experts.46 Although expert advice may be successful in
some cases, the result is more likely to be polarizing. The
employee’s lawyer simply finds a competing expert. Besides,
most polarized whistleblower cases have dimensions beyond
technical disagreements, such as trust issues or traditions or
long-unaddressed issues that must be considered in order to
address the underlying issues and resolve the conflict.47

7. Typically, internal and external whistleblower programs have
neither the mandate nor the tools to address a sufficient range of

46

Inst. Pub. Pol’y and Mgmt., supra note 2 (describing attempted resolutions through
primary subject matter).
47
Id.
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the conflict’s aspects.48 Particularly well-developed employee
concerns programs can be exceptions to certain of these role and
tool problems, but they are not the norm. Consistent exceptions
are found in plants covered by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission49 and in some other specific contexts, such as in
situations where companies have invested in robust programs
that address the full range of issues, including technical issues.
G. Forces within the workforce and workplace discourage employees from
blowing the whistle.
1.

Many of these disputes involve peer pressure and ostracizing of
employees, neither of which can adequately be addressed in
court action, settlements based on employment rights, or
through typical internal investigations and solutions. Such
conflicts present challenges to unions due to the difficulties
presented by internal strife and peer-to-peer resentments.

2. Many of these cases lead employees and management to choose
sides and, subsequently, to try to influence outcomes even
though they lack access to facts that might later be discovered.
The impacts on work relationships can be personally and
institutionally devastating.
3. It is also common for a convenient and non-factual “narrative”
to develop about the situation, which may preclude upper
management from making an objective examination of the
situation, despite a sincere desire to do so. Generally, these
narratives include a negative depiction of the employee who
raised the whistleblower complaint, undermining his or her
credibility and motivations. In the Council’s experience, these
narratives are almost always exaggerated, frequently inaccurate,
and based substantially on personality clashes or a defensive
posturing rather than on actual work behavior. This narrative
may drive decisions that are not buttressed by a closer, de novo

48
49

See Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1.
U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N.
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look at the situation.50
H. Resolutions reached by administrative and regulatory agencies, courts,
and other traditional bodies often lack finality and stability.
1.

The availability and common uses of appeals steps often means
that first steps in investigations and adjudications in many
administrative procedures have become meaningless because of
parties’ penchant to appeal.51

2.

A win-lose system encourages the use of appeals. A system that
more fully addresses both parties’ underlying issues does not as
frequently result in a loser that feels the need to appeal, or a
company or employee that feels compelled to use other means
to achieve key objectives.

3.

Ongoing conflict affects not just the employee involved in the
issue, but also witnesses, supervisors, management, other
employees, union representatives, and staff that may have been
involved through ancillary duties. The original issue is
frequently still languishing and the interpersonal and other
workplace conflicts are left to worsen.

4. If the remedies available are restricted to adjudicating
employment rights, many important items will be left
unresolved (and, often, to fester) for a future conflict.

50
This is a common observation in cases received by the Council, especially the most
polarized and complex. I am indebted to attorney Billie Pirner Garde for helping to
describe and recognize this and many other phenomena and patterns in whistleblower
cases.
51
Many attorneys who practice in this area, some of whom have interacted with the
Council, have described that the appeals processes in some programs are seen as more
favorable or at least inevitable. Consequently, their attention to or faith in the initial
investigation by the administrative agency has, unfortunately, been reduced. The
workload in some of these administrative processes relative to the resources available has
also impaired the timeliness and, sometimes, thoroughness of what can be done at those
levels, further reducing the confidence that one side or the other has in the initial
administrative investigations. The relative finality of the Council process (presumptive
implementation) is the factor that makes it attractive to many of the parties, and, in
particular, to the employee advocates and senior corporate officials involved.
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IV. HOW THE HANFORD COUNCIL SYSTEM WORKS TO ADDRESS
THESE COMMON LIMITATIONS52
The Council operates within a Charter agreement, which establishes
parameters and authorities for the Council, but allows adaptation of
methods to the issues and dynamics in each dispute.53 The Council Charter,
with modest exceptions, provides authority to address the full range of
issues and guards against other typical limitations to addressing
whistleblower case resolution by providing the following:
A. Support and guidance for exercising rights
1.

The Council system provides the employee regular contact with
staff and selected members of the Council to help the employee
understand his rights, alternatives, and approaches to dealing
with the stresses of the process.54 While the Council does not
provide legal advice (and while employees are free to seek it)
very few employees find the need to seek legal advice because
of the respectful, non-mysterious, and comprehensive nature of
the process.

52

See generally JONATHAN BROCK, BARGAINING BEYOND IMPASSE: JOINT
RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR DISPUTES 217–54 (2007) [hereinafter BROCK,
BARGAINING BEYOND IMPASSE]; Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1.
53
The concept of having a “Charter” document to capture the authorities and related
basic agreements about Council operation was the creation of Gerald Cormick, a
distinguished mediator who followed up after the 1992 University of Washington study.
He brought the parties together around the concepts in the study to see if a workable
mechanism could be built on these concepts. Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note
1, at 508–09.
54
HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 13, at 5. Usually, an
employee advocate representative is assigned to be the primary liaison for employees
with a case before the Council. Normally, the employee and the representative will speak
regularly, often weekly or more often, to be sure that the Council is updated on the
situation and the employee is aware of developments and needs in the assessment and in
the development of a resolution. This creates a valuable channel for avoiding surprises,
for information exchange, for problem solving as things arise, and for greater trust and
clarity when the resolution is available for presentation. Employees may call other
members of the Council if they wish, including company representatives, and often do so.
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2. The Council examines the situation de novo. It does not rely on
prior reports, rumors or assumptions about the situation or the
employee. The Council begins by listening to the initial
presentations of the employee without judgment or argument,
and then commits to an objective assessment, including
solicitation of company views. The assessment process contains
deliberate steps and check-ins so that the issues of concern, or in
contention, are fully explored and the conclusions are unlikely
to be a surprise. Part of the mediation agreement that the parties
(company and employee) must sign is a promise that the
employee and company will cooperate with the process and
participate constructively as requested.55
B. Protection from retaliation, escalation, and associated stresses
1.

The tools used by the Council are tailored to the circumstances
and include consistency with applicable law, bargaining
agreements, and more. For example, the Council system is able
to introduce specific protections, such as removing the
employee to a different work area, forestalling an upcoming
evaluation, or even a pending termination, or taking other
temporary measures to prevent escalation and additional stress.56

2.

Others in the company that might have a role in the
investigation of the concern, or other aspects of the case, are
normally required to fully suspend these activities. In addition,
supervisory or administrative contacts with the employee are
also carefully managed during the case in order to preclude
actions that could exacerbate tensions and divert focus from the

55

HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, JOINT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (May
2008), available at http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/joint_mou.pdf
[hereinafter HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING]. The
Council requires that a mediation agreement (or Memorandum of Understanding—MOU)
be signed by the employee and employer and the Council that outlines mutual
requirements and expectations. Id. This includes confidentiality, cooperation, and the
expectation that other processes will be put on hold while the Council works on the case.
Id. This provides additional confidentiality protection to all and a reminder of expected
behaviors and obligations. Id.
56
Charter, supra note 7, § 7.5 (discussing stabilization).
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problem solving work and the day-to-day jobs of company and
employee. In the event of a business need to contact the
employee during a case, such contacts are normally coordinated
with the Council in order to avoid misunderstandings or
prejudicial actions by either party.57 Usually, a specific protocol
is worked out with the employee’s chain of command.
3.

Neither party may start new proceedings in connection with the
issue or work outside the Council system on the case while the
Council has jurisdiction. If they do, the Council will normally
cease work.58 This prohibition helps keep everyone focused on
the problem solving process and minimizes posturing and other
activities that reduce candor and divert energy from resolution.59

C. Problem solving focus and blame-free approach keeps the effort on
solutions and avoids further polarization and conflict
1.

A problem solving focus and the employment of techniques
designed to achieve resolution also represents a break from what
has usually been, up to that point, an escalating conflict between
the parties, typified by defensive statements and related
posturing by both parties.

57

Id. § 7.5.2.
HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 55.
In my experience, if there is another ongoing process through OSHA, the DOE, the court,
or elsewhere, attention is diverted, trust eroded, and sometimes processes are “played”
against each other. Thus, the Council has made it a practice not to work on a case if that
case is active in another process. A grievance on an unrelated item or adjudication of a
health concern—which the Council does not perform—may go on at the same time if the
Council determines that this does not interfere with the Council’s process. Through the
MOU, the Council gets the employer and employee to approach the sponsor of any
process that has been started and request a “freeze” in the process without any party
giving up rights to restart the process. Often this requires the employee or the company or
both to make a formal request to such agencies and agents. Id.
59
Discussions with Council members who have been advocates for whistleblowers in
courts, in administrative processes, and with company members produced this insight
about their greater willingness to candidly and creatively participate in Council cases.
This is also a common occurrence in mediation, and among the reasons for
confidentiality being a common element of most mediation practices. Brock, Full and
Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 516.
58

VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 2 • 2013

599

600 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

2.

The purposes of the blame-free, problem solving mandate are to
find a reasonable solution to the underlying problem, keep the
project on track, improve safety culture, repair the damaged
workplace trust and relationships, and to otherwise restore (or
minimize damage to) career trajectory.

3.

Members of the Council are appointed with this mandate.
Council procedures that begin with assessment and proceed to
build a blame-free solution reflect this approach.60

4.

The blame-free approach, combined with confidentiality,
usually produces candor, a willingness to solve problems, and a
reduction in the need for defensive activities and statements.

5.

Consensus resolution creates strong support among the company
representatives and CEO, employee advocates, and the affected
employee for the resolution; it also protects Council members
from fear of being “outvoted.” Risks of instability from appeals
or effective opposition are, thus, minimized.

D. Presence of Council members from both advocacy and company
perspectives, who are familiar with the site, relevant safety practices,
and applicable laws and rights, enables balanced and credible
resolutions61

60
Members receive and sign a letter of appointment that specifies their responsibility to
seek solutions, to maintain confidentiality, and to follow other practices that contribute to
resolving issues. Charter, supra note 7, § 4.5. They also receive material that describes
the function of the members in the various Council positions and the common
commitment to creating resolutions. Id.
61
The following outline pertains to the discussion in this section, and elsewhere in the
paper, on the membership composition of the Council, which is a specific design feature
of the system. This balanced membership feature and other features of the Hanford
Council system are premised, in part, on features of a system developed in the 1970s to
deal with polarized and contentious issues in police and firefighter bargaining in
Massachusetts. BROCK, BARGAINING BEYOND IMPASSE, supra note 52, at 217–54. This
chapter describes the importance of such features in developing a successful conflict
resolution system in circumstances that otherwise tend to fall towards polarization and
solutions that do not address the causes of the conflict. Id. Similar features can be found
in other standing systems, including those referred to above in fisheries, health care and
elsewhere, and are the principles that underlie much of private arbitration and mediation
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1.

Presence of senior, experienced corporate officers in the system
a)

Bypassing supervisory, mid-level, and staff offices in
decision making (but not for input or testimony on the issues)
precludes those who were parties to the conflict, or who
might normally be charged with automatically defending the
company from biasing the assessment or recommendations,
allows a fresh discussion of the issues without emotion or
pride in the way, and avoids influence of the negative
narrative that often builds up.

b) While it seems unusual to some to have employer
representatives involved directly and candidly in problem
solving, employer involvement provides knowledge of site
and company practices, as well as of dynamics within the
company common to whistleblower disputes. The presence of
these corporate players speeds access to information and
helps the Council collect facts, keeping solutions consistent
with mission and organizational goals. It also creates
advocates within the company for the recommended
resolution.
c)

Direct access by the Council via the company representatives
and Chair of the Council to the company president for
recommendations protects confidentiality and provides
authority for policy and practice changes and allocation of
resources to the solution. Lower levels do not have the
authority to change behaviors and policies, to take
exceptional actions, or to authorize most stabilization actions.
The ability to take a well-formed conclusion and resolution to
the company president precludes the parochial biases in other
quarters from influencing the decisions on whistleblower
cases. The company president takes the most complete view
of corporate and site missions and interests, and normally
finds the Council resolution to be far preferable to available
alternatives, particularly those framed by the case’s initial

clauses in commercial contracts. See Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at
517–19.
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trajectory into conflict mode prior to Council involvement.62
d) The presence of senior company representatives in the
Council system gives the company president confidence in
the recommendation. Recommendations only go forward if
they are a product of consensus.63
2.

Presence of respected employee advocates in the system64
a)

The employee advocates on the Council have experience with
aggrieved individuals, can help interpret concerns that people
often have when raising whistleblower issues, and can better
anticipate the value of contemplated solutions.

b) These employee advocates ensure that the matter is fully
explored relative to the concerns of the employee and that the
matter is appropriately resolved.
c)

The advocate members of the Hanford Council ensure that
solutions are consistent with the whistleblower’s rights under
law and that the resolutions will resolve the issues that gave
rise to the concern. The advocates also help the others in the
Council system to be aware of how an employee will
experience the actions taken by the Council to assess and
resolve the case. This proves to be very helpful in gaining
credibility and in facilitating practical resolutions. Employee
advocate members also play a crucial part in providing initial
credibility to the system, support to employees during the
process, wisdom in seeking practical resolutions and
protecting rights, and confidence and substance to the
outcomes.

62

This has been the ongoing experience in Council interaction with CEO’s regarding
Council resolutions, as predicted in the University of Washington study. Inst. Pub. Pol’y
and Mgmt., supra note 2; Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 516. My
experience continues to affirm the value seen in this process by CEOs as opposed to
alternative methods, though the degree of engagement and interest naturally varies.
63
Charter, supra note 7, §§ 2.6, 1.2.
64
Id. § 4.2.3; Inst. Pub. Pol’y and Mgmt., supra note 2; Brock, Full and Fair Resolution,
supra note 1, at 517–19; HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note
13, at 5.
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d) As with the exclusion of corporate personnel who had been
previously involved in the case or who might represent the
case in later proceedings, should the Council process fail,
advocacy members of the Council are similarly restricted to
those who have not taken a position, and who would not be
involved with future representation. This also protects
independence and confidentiality of Council system
activities.65
E. Capacity and mandate to address the full range of issues in the case,
which may include safety systems and practices, culture and
interpersonal issues, and harm or potential harm to the employees
career66
1.

The Council system increases chances of resolution and lowers
odds of lingering issues leading to new conflict by creating
solutions that deal with the range of safety, employment,
interpersonal, policy, and workplace issues that may be present.

2.

A comprehensive resolution also makes it more likely that the
precipitating cause is addressed.

3.

Because employers, advocacy groups, and the DOE endorse the
Council system, Council recommendations are expected to be
implemented. When any of that support is in doubt, the
resolution is less likely to be stable. Any voluntary system that
seeks to supplement existing systems needs the support of the
authoritative and influential parties who would otherwise use
existing statutory and administrative systems.

F. Confidentiality helps the Council system to preclude forces and
considerations that interfere with exploring underlying causes and a
creative search for options67

65

Charter, supra note 7, § 6.1.2 (requiring that a member recuse himself or herself if an
actual or potential conflict of interest arises).
66
Inst. Pub. Pol’y and Mgmt., supra note 2; Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note
1, at 500–02.
67
Charter, supra note 7, § 5.0.
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68

1.

Confidentiality keeps out extraneous considerations and
pressures on decision-makers and contributes to lowering the
stress and pressures on the employee and managers who may
have been involved and who may feel as if pride is on the line.

2.

Confidentiality, recusal and related process protections
contribute to an independent and calm examination of the
issues, and allow not only a full examination of what occurred
and what did not, but also an exploration (and discarding, as
appropriate) of a wide range of alternatives that can include
strategic considerations and implications well beyond the
mandate of narrower internal or agency systems.

3.

Confidentiality, recusal, and related processes help to quickly
and thoroughly bring in information and considerations that
focus on addressing the problems that gave rise to the initial
complaint and led to the subsequent conflict. Confidentiality
reduces the defensiveness common to on-the-record and
adjudicatory or administrative proceedings, and, therefore,
allows greater exploration of problems and alternatives. These
features can establish the assurance that the neither party is
placed in a disadvantageous position should the mediation fail.68

5.

Confidentiality keeps these cases out of the newspapers and out
of the gossip chain (made the worse by electronic
communications) and, thereby, reduces the diversion and other
harms that otherwise result from the high level of gossip and
rumors that frequently accompany such cases. All gossip cannot
be stopped, but confidentiality leads to a noticeable reduction in
volume and impact, which is highly beneficial in keeping focus
on the issues and saving the energy of those who should not be
involved. No case before the Council has been the subject of a
news story once the Council took the case, though most similar
cases outside the Council’s jurisdiction (e.g., in nonparticipating companies) often are.

Id. § 6.1.2.
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G. Flexibility of tools to fit the issues
1.

While available tools are not limitless, the Council system is not
locked into one set of procedures and can select approaches,
tools, and remedies that it believes, by consensus, are likely to
be effective. For example, if a case requires outside experts, the
Council can bring in experts—chosen by agreement of all
seats—and the experts thus engaged are everyone’s experts to
freshly examine the designated issues. If the case requires
involvement of the employee in a reform effort to address an
inadequate policy, the Council system can arrange for this to
occur. If the situation requires stabilization, or if certain actions
need to be frozen while the case is addressed, this can usually be
done consistent with ongoing project needs.69

2.

Limits of resources and authority certainly exist but, in general,
the focus on solution rather than process provides more ways to
succeed.

H. Agreement on the system by the participating parties, a clear
relationship to other existing systems,70 and rights pertaining to safety
and resolution of employment rights conflicts
1.

The Council system depends on the Charter agreement to which
participating companies and participating advocacy groups
agree.71 This combination of clarity and agreement contributes

69

See, e.g., id. §§ 1, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.4, 1.3, 2.5, 2.6.3, 2.7, 7.5, 7.7, 9.1.6, 9.2.
These provisions illustrate that the Council is not bound to any one process or type of
resolution, and may approach cases as it deems necessary within the bounds of the
charter.
70
BROCK, BARGAINING BEYOND IMPASSE, supra note 52, at 244. See also JONATHAN
BROCK ET AL., WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS CTR., RUCKELSHAUS CENTER REPORT: THE
SHARED STRATEGY FOR PUGET SOUND: A DESCRIPTION AND INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF
COLLABORATIVE SALMON RECOVERY PLANNING IN WASHINGTON STATE AS OF JUNE
2008
(2008),
available
at
http://pcc.wsu.edu/projects/documents/
SharedStrategyFinalReport-summaryonly.pdf [hereinafter BROCK ET AL., THE SHARED
STRATEGY] (discussing a dispute that concerned developing a plan to recover salmon in
the Puget Sound, the estuary on which Seattle, Tacoma, and other cities sit).
71
First-hand experience of the Charter’s reviews for improvements and adjustments by
joint teams of corporate, advocacy, neutral members, and with the cooperation of the
DOE, most prominently in 2004 and 2005.
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to flexibility and stability and shows the relationship to existing
rights and processes.
2.

The Charter specifies the mandate in terms of types of cases
(e.g., safety and environmental health cases are included, but
classified data, financial, or workers’ compensation cases are
not) and authorities (e.g., consensus requirement to gain
implementation or stabilization authority).72

3.

Existing rights are protected and not overridden,73 but the
parties can agree to defer exercise of those rights and must do so
for the time the Council is working on the case. If a case is taken
into the system, the Council has exclusive jurisdiction and
engages the cooperation of agencies to put the agency case on
hold for a specified time period. However, the employee may
leave the Council process at any time.74

72

Charter, supra note 7, § 1.2.2 (listing the areas where the Council may not do case
work, including areas involving classified information).
73
During the Charter development process, the principle of preserving the rights of the
parties was recognized as important to encouraging employees, but also prospective
participating companies. Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 511. If an
employee was to give up a right to sue or pursue administrative processes, spending
months in the Council’s mediation process would seem much less attractive, particularly
since aggrieved employees are not trustful of the employer at that point, nor are they
familiar with the Council. Id. Similarly, employers often are not trustful of an employee’s
good faith at that stage of the conflict. Id. The shared strategy also resulted in a seminal
decision to protect tribal rights to fisheries, although many other parties sought to restrict
them as a condition of the conflict resolution process, and the rights and authorities of
agencies and other players were not altered in statute. Id. In practice, new structures for
developing consensus recommendations changed how these rights and authorities were
exercised and how problems were evaluated prior to taking action. Id. The shared
strategy system, approved by the federal Government like the Council, is a much larger
scale example of a mediation system that supplements, but does not replace existing
authorities for oversight, regulation, and managing the tasks. Id.
74
HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 55
(containing provisions for putting other processes on hold, as well as the parties’
agreement to continue to do so, or leave the Council process, and allowing the employee
the option to leave). Mediation is by definition a voluntary process, as opposed to a
process like binding arbitration, or a contractual agreement to arbitrate certain kinds of
disputes. The MOU also states that the parties will “leave the case to the Council” while
it is in the Council’s jurisdiction, precluding other actions to affect or process the case. Id.
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4.

The proposed resolution requires consensus, protecting the
rights and interests of all, but the method of appointments,
process of examination, confidentiality, and other structural
features provide the Council with independence and a problem
solving focus to ensure the prospects for reaching consensus.

5.

Once reached and approved, Council resolutions may be
implemented through the employer’s normal systems (e.g.,
changed job assignment or normal systems for revising
practices).75

6.

Also, any violations of law or regulation must be reported.76 The
format for reporting is usually determined by which party or what
mechanism is required to make the report.

7.

The Council system, while independent of the company,
advocacy groups, and government agencies, is largely a
supplement to the rest of the safety and personnel apparatus.
a)

The Council exercises independent judgment and proposes
action to which other company processes must defer as
required by the Charter. The Council resolution is fashioned

75

Charter, supra note 7, § 2.6. While the Council gains a form of temporary authority to
handle the issue, the fact that its recommendation goes to the president of the affected
company is emblematic of the fact that it is the president’s authority over the company
that will allow the specifics of the recommendation to proceed. Id. This ability is subject
to what is legal under the company’s contract with the DOE. Id. Rights and processes are
established through collective bargaining contracts and other applicable laws. Id. Because
of company representation on the Council, these items are normally anticipated or can be
worked through in the implementation. Id. The Council chair, for example, has no
authority to hire, transfer, expend corporate funds, or to mandate changes in engineering
or other safety processes. Id. Thus, the charter refers to a “consensus recommendation”
made to the president of the affected company that will be “presumptively implemented.”
Id. The latter term was carefully chosen to indicate that the recommendation could be
rejected only in rare and relatively specific instances. No recommendation has ever been
rejected. Id.
76
Id. § 5.7. Particularly because nuclear safety is a very specialized area and heavily
regulated, the parties developing the charter recognized the necessity of maintaining the
integrity of safety reporting systems and keeping the employees and company in
compliance with nuclear safety requirements, while preserving confidentiality of
mediation. Id.
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creatively in response to the overall set of issues: it extends
beyond the jurisdiction of any one program, agency, or
section of the corporation, but integrates into a single solution
package and may include case-specific items as well as
system repair aspects.
b) Council-proposed resolutions have to be within applicable
law and within existing systems of managing employment
and operations on the site. Often, specific coordination, or
even sign-off, is required if the matter had previously been
before a court or regulatory authority and was deferred or
referred to the Council system. If a grievance procedure was
suspended in deference to the Council process, the union
would have to agree that the matter is resolved and withdraw
the grievance. The Council works as needed with union
leadership and employee relations representatives to ensure
consistency with collectively bargained rights.
c)

Partly through these forms of coordination with entities that
are protecting rights of the employee or employer, the results
of the Council’s supplemental system gains legitimacy. This
finality contributes to precluding recriminations or appeal.77

d) Importantly, statutes, regulations, and related administrative
procedures provide employees with standing and require the
employer to be attentive (though many company and agency
leaders are highly interested in these issues anyway).
However, these statutorily established systems may not, by
themselves, be sufficiently protective or stabilizing because
of the lack the breadth of jurisdiction or resources to fully
solve the issues in a particular setting or circumstance.78

77

Dwight Golan & Eric E. Van Loon, Legal Issues in Consensus Building, in THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 495, 506 (1999) (discussing recommendations to the
authority of the affected company’s president and legal and contractual requirements he
or she is required to follow); Charter, supra note 7, § 2.6.
78
JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 44–45 (1997) (reference at the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) during the mid-1990s that introduced mediation and other practices
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e) Thus, supplementing these statutory systems and derivative
practices may be a beneficial response to meeting policy
goals of more robust protection and examination and stable
resolution of the substantive problems that employees are
asked to bring forward, as well as the attendant conflicts.
8.

Without being linked to a statutory requirement for
whistleblower protection, a supplemental system like the
Council system would engender even more opposition, and
might be seen as an interloper or a nuisance. Having an agreed
upon protocol, like the Charter, that defines the authorities and
tools as they relate to existing rights, obligations, and
procedures is critical in order to create a trustworthy and
effective system in which all parties know what to expect. In
design and in practice, mapping the supplemental system
carefully in relation to existing authorities, and specifically
considering where to place authority for moving a case to the
supplemental system and how to gain implementation are of
critical importance.

9.

Because both employee advocates and employer representatives
are involved, resolutions have a level of practicality and
acceptability that would be missing if the resolutions had been
developed by an outside panel of experts.79

to reduce backlogs and increase effectiveness of the EEOC’s employment discrimination
mandate).
79
BROCK, BARGAINING BEYOND IMPASSE, supra note 52, at 244; e.g., BROCK ET AL.,
THE SHARED STRATEGY, supra note 70. This study describes, in detail, from more than a
hundred interviews and extensive document review, the principle of joint membership
from all sides of the issue and involvement of the levels of authority that were involved.
Id. It also describes how the consensus work of the entities established was mapped into
existing state, federal, tribal, county, municipal authorities and regulations. Id. The shared
strategy structure, the primary conflict over management of salmon to promote recovery
of listed species under the Endangered Species Act, is perhaps the largest such policy
mediation in recent US history, as well as the first to provide a mediated, local alternative
to a federal listing. Id.
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V. WHY IT WORKS AND HOW THE PRINCIPLES MIGHT BE APPLIED
TO SUPPLEMENT EXISTING SYSTEMS
A number of unique but theory-based principles help to explain why the
Council system provides a valuable supplement. Among them is the mixed
and balanced membership of the Council, which results in a greater capacity
to positively affect site practices. Thus, underlying problems can be
recognized and addressed during assessment and development of
recommendations, and internal company officers can advocate for the
solution and its implementation. If a participating company has a
commitment to presumptively implement cases resolved with a consensus
recommendation, the resolutions will encourage employees and advocates
to have faith in the system and will ensure that the Council’s time is not
wasted. Furthermore, the employer will know that it will not be asked to
implement a recommendation that is not supported by the corporate
advocate, as well as by the employee advocate and neutral members of the
Council.80
Resolutions of the Council normally include steps that improve the
systems and practices in the workplace from which the complaint came.
One result is that companies learn new ways to get ahead of many safety,
health, or retaliation issues through the informal interaction and problem
solving in the system. This system also improves the problem solving
awareness of many senior managers, who have often expressed gratitude for
the chance to serve on the Council.81 At the same time, affected employees
have their status and career trajectory restored. And even in the rare
instance of an employee leaving employment, it is by a resolution he or she
has accepted. This will at least end the argument and allow the employee to
go on with his or her life, and allow the employer to go on with the project.
Under almost any Council system outcome, appeals, recriminations, and
80
81

Charter, supra note 7, § 2.6 (discussing consensus).
This is a frequent comment from departing and past Council members.
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other ways of continuing the conflict are largely precluded.
Thus, this special mediation process at Hanford demonstrates how
attention to the nuanced features of whistleblower conflicts and the gaps in
the typical channels available can lead to better results for whistleblowers
and employers. This is best done by supplemental steps that retain a
relationship to existing systems and rights, but which reflect the need for
independence and confidentiality. Gaining these benefits does not require
the specific system used at Hanford, but successful systems do require
dealing with the issues of independence, confidentiality, protection,
stabilization, support, flexible tools, in depth and rapid assessment of the
underlying issues, use of local authority and knowledge, and means of
guaranteeing implementation, among others.

VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LESSONS FROM THE COUNCIL SYSTEM
Features of the Hanford Council system could be made a part of many
internal complaint resolution systems and some regulatory systems, or
could be established as independent and supplemental to those systems.
(Issues in structuring and managing existing regulatory programs represent
a separate topic, worthy of their own exploration.) Although some cases
should be litigated or used to set or alter policy, most of the adversarialbased programs do not contain sufficient channels, protections, tools, and
structures to encourage, protect, and ultimately solve whistleblower issues.
A system that could produce consistent problem resolution and encourage
people to come forward would seem to need more features, breadth, and
flexibility, which can lead to real problem solving, than are generally
available. The new whistleblower protections in Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank appear to have many of these broader features, as well as
additional challenges.82 Perhaps principles in the Council system that
82

See generally Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 40.
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respond to limiting factors in many statutory, judicial, regulatory, and
administrative channels are features that can, at least on some scale (perhaps
even with some of the newer statutes) be used to supplement what might
otherwise be in place, thereby adding to the likelihood of intended results.
Furthermore, other “supplements” to the simple investigatory and
adversarial model have also been successfully used. For example, the
EEOC, under the leadership of Chairman Paul Miller in the mid-1990s,83
developed a “tracked” system whereby concerns that seemed to need
investigation could be put on a “track” where they would be investigated.
Cases that seemed susceptible to mediation went to a newly trained cadre
and system that was prepared for this purpose. With these and other
reforms, the results showed major reductions in backlog.84 Where they are
not already, triage and “tracking” of cases can be part of agency or
corporate systems in order to help set priorities and provide the appropriate
treatment to different types of cases, as well as to allocate resources more
effectively.
Greater use of interim protection reduces extraneous pressures and
posturing while the case is assessed and can also be a part of corporate
systems; such interim protection could perhaps be more widely permitted or
encouraged in agency practices, though statutory considerations may affect
possibilities. In another application, the internal employee complaints or
concerns investigation functions can be more fully and consistently
independent of other functions. To avoid the inevitable biases, and often
more limited mandate and perspective, that seem to come from mid-levels
in the organization, the investigatory function can report directly to the
CEO and eschew contact or involvement with other parties who have their
own opinions or interests in the outcome. For related reasons, such
83

DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 78.
Id. at 152 (describing how mediation and arbitration can be used in administrative
agencies).
84
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programs could have stricter confidentiality practices, as many already do.
Without strict confidentiality practices, internal program risks being
captured by the negative narrative and pressures that minimize the issues
and the employee’s credibility. Insufficient confidentiality will reduce
opportunities for candor and trust. At times, the employee may be wrong or,
in some instances, wrongly motivated, but a truly independent assessment
will identify that if it is present. Confidentiality can help to deal with this
result in ways that contribute to maintaining a safe environment in which
people can come forward. Just as a corporation will more likely cooperate if
its pride and dignity can be protected during a process, employees are more
likely to accept responsibility, or a different outcome than they hoped for, if
they are similarly respected by the process. This is made more difficult
when they know that the person before them in the queue has a report in a
file that reads “not substantiated.” Clearly, there are many typical barriers
that we know can be addressed by supplementary mechanisms and that can
benefit from the principles in this article.
The following list summarizes key principles identified in this article that
could be considered for use in developing, or otherwise supplementing
many existing programs and systems for addressing whistleblower
concerns:
1.

Ensuring that the most appropriate tools are being used for resolving
the issues and conflicts in the case; ensuring flexibility and breadth
in the tool kit;

2.

Using more mediation and other supplemental methods that do not
require having a winner and a loser, or otherwise reducing the risks
for both parties to engage in real problem solving;

3.

Including representatives from both sides of the dispute who are
knowledgeable of the issues and sufficiently respected to be able to
help persuade the employee and company to accept the resolution
and to increase practicality and acceptability of the resolution;

4.

Structuring systems to address substantive concerns as well as
retaliation and employment impacts that are protected by statute;
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5.

Providing more independence to whistleblower case assessments;

6.

Using strict confidentiality practices to help keep the program and
case assessments independent and free from gossip, workplace
pressures, biases, and conflicts of interest, and to help promote
candor and creativity;

7.

Relying on a non-adversarial process focused on problem solving
rather than on finding fault;

8.

Providing stability and otherwise reducing pressures, stresses, and
escalation while the concern is addressed;

9.

Including stabilization protections to prevent escalation and provide
ongoing guidance to an employee so that he or she can manage the
inevitable stresses of working through the resolution;

10. Preserving the rights of all parties in the event the process does not
solve the problem and increasing their security to enter the process;
11. Bypassing the levels and functions in the organization that tend to
focus only on certain parts of the picture or have reasons to be
defensive; precluding those with a vested interest from involvement;
12. Delivering the results to the president or other higher level in the
company with the authority to take action and the perspective to see
the full set of organizational implications;
13. Establishing the forum and setting to allow a full opportunity for
quiet and deliberate assessment and solution development;
14. Creating accountability for fair outcomes and mutual confidence of
the employer and employee community; and,
15. Linking the system appropriately to existing recognized and related
sources of authority and rights so that the process and solution will
have legitimacy; making it a supplement, not a substitute.

VII. CONCLUSION
In the absence of established rights or the threat of enforcement,
litigation, or other consequences, these more cooperative methods and
supplemental methods would likely not bring people to the table. Although
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these supplements are only part of the policy picture and tool kit, they can
make existing rights much more effective by eliminating or reducing gaps
in tools and tendencies that actually create instability in processes and
intended resolutions. Without such supplements to many existing and
emerging systems, workers that come forward will be without adequate
means to have their concerns fairly and effectively evaluated and resolved,
or will not come forward at all because the stakes are too high. Companies
will continue to adopt postures that are primarily defensive because of the
risks they face. The result will be continued frustration and failure to match
policy intent.
By examining the Hanford Council system example, an interested
observer can find prospects for allowing and encouraging supplemental
systems to be tailored to industry or local circumstances, while remaining
related to existing law and rights and systems for carrying the business
forward. Because the Hanford Council system successfully addresses
limitations common to existing whistleblower programs, these principles for
a more effective system have promise in application elsewhere. Without any
change in law, most, if not all, of the features discussed in this paper can be
used in many settings to get better outcomes if established in relation to
specific industries, workplace situations, and other circumstances.85 The
Hanford Council system should not be cloned, but its lessons can provide
principles, tools, or techniques that can be applied.
Such supplementary processes can, without new legislation—and
particularly with the unsatisfactory default alternative to return to
adversarial pathway, be implemented via agreement between union and
management, by agency and a company or industry—perhaps as part of
settling an enforcement action or legal dispute, or by agreement between
whistleblower advocates and a company or industry, or by other means.
85

See, e.g., id.; BROCK ET AL., THE SHARED STRATEGY, supra note 70.
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Certainly these principles could be used to inform new legislation and
agency reform. In this context, there are opportunities to streamline and
otherwise improve the structure of whistleblower legislation and
enforcement, which has grown up over decades in response to many
different problems and pressures. In the meantime, much can be done.
The Hanford Council system shows how one voluntary (but specifically
structured) system, set up to supplement existing systems, employs
principles that can work in a wide variety of settings and programs. Only if
we can find ways to provide the tools and features necessary to overcome
the inherent weaknesses in typical structures for whistleblower protection
can we redeem the promise of rights to whistleblowers and hopes for
discovering and addressing the issues we wish them to raise.

WHISTLEBLOWING

